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INTRODUCTION

On the eve of the federal judiciary's bicentennial anniversary, our
courts are challenged with a statute whose various elements pose "the
widest and most persistent circuit split on an issue of federal law in
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recent memory."' The source of this persistent circuit split relates to
the scope, breadth and reach of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).2
The RICO statute was forged in the tradition of antitrust and securities legislation, which contained criminal as well as civil remedies
and private rights of action. The statute was enacted in 1970 and, for

the first decade of its existence, resulted in mainly criminal prosecutions.3 Thereafter, however, the private civil remedies provided by
the RICO statute have become the basis for ever-increasing action by
civil litigants.4 Perhaps the primary reasons for this increased utilization of civil remedies include: (1) congressional expansion of the
predicate offenses, (2) the statutory provisions for liberal construction,
(3) the use of a mere preponderance evidentiary burden, and (4) the

lure of treble damages and attorney fees.5
The purpose of this article is to help the civil practitioner prepare
for the defense or offense of a civil RICO case and keep in mind the
ever-present possibilities of criminal RICO prosecutions. Accord-

ingly, the article will begin with a general overview of the legislative
history of RICO, a discussion of the statutory elements of RICO, and
an analysis of the implications of the use of differing burdens of proof
and issues of discovery for civil and criminal actions. The authors

hope that the issues raised by this article and the possible "chilling
effect" that they pose will stimulate debate, encourage the self-imposition of prosecutorial restraints and spur reform through legislation.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The RICO statute was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime

Control Act of 19706 and is codified at 18 U.S.C. sections 1961
1. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4951, 4956 (U.S. Jun. 27,
1989)(Scalia, J., concurring).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
3. See, e.g., Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the PublicInterest: "Everybody's
Darling",19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 662 n.4 (1982)(noting fewer than 50 decided civil RICO
cases as of spring 1982); Parrish, RICO Civil Remedies: An Untapped Resourcefor Insurers,49
INS. COUNS. J. 337, 338 n.6 (1982)(indicating 29 civil suits filed as of May, 1982).
4. See Patton, Civil RICO., Statutory and Implied Elements of the Treble Damage Remedy, 14 TEX. TECH L. REV. 377, 381 (1983)(potential treble damage recovery increased
number of civil RICO suits filed).
5. Id. at 378-81.
6. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970).
For an extensive chronicling of the legislative history of the OCCA, see Blakey, The RICO
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through 1968. After three congressional sessions of debate, the 91st
Congress approved the statute in response to ineffective government
efforts to stem the tide of organized crime.7 Prosecution of organized
crime figures had failed to produce convictions due to what were
termed "defects in the evidence gathering process. "8
In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice prepared its Task Force Report recommending
the use of new approaches to fight the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime.9 This report stimulated the introduction of a
series of Senate bills.'° After recommendations from the antitrust section of the American Bar Association, I I the Department of Justice,' 2
and after numerous Senate hearings, the process culminated in the
introduction of Senate Bill 1861.13 Referred to the Subcommittee on
Criminal Law of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the ensuing legislative process produced an amended version of 18 U.S.C. § 1861. The
House made minor revisions' 4 and the final version of what today is

Civil FraudAction in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237,
249-80 (1982); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO):
Basic Concepts-Criminaland Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L. Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980). Professor Blakey served as Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures during the passage of the OCCA.
7. D. SMITH & T. REED, CIVIL RICO, 1.01 at 1-1 (1988).

8. Id. at 1-8 n.26 (remarks of Senator McClellan).
9. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task
Force Report: Organized Crime, at 16-24 (1967).
10. For a concise discussion of these bills, see D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 1.01
(legislative history).
11. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7,
1.01, at 1-3 n.8 (Report of Anti-Trust Section
of ABA). The Anti-Trust Section objected to a proposed amendment to the Sherman Act that

indicated anti-trust precedent posed barriers on issues of standing and proximate cause. The
Anti-Trust Section advocated a separate criminal statute. It reasoned that the primary goal of
the Sherman Act was to maintain free competition and, thus, an amendment designed to
broadly combat organized crime was inappropriate. Note, Business Law-Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt OrganizationsAct (RICO)-MaintenanceOf A Private Civil RICO Action
Does Not Require A Showing That The Defendant Has Been Criminally Convicted Of The Predicate Acts Nor That The Plaintiff Has Sustained A "Racketeering Injury" Distinct From The
Alleged Predicate Acts, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 465, 469 n.19 (1986).
12. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7,
1.01, at 3 n.10. The Department of Justice
contributed greatly to the development of section 1962(c) by criticizing the initial vague language regarding "any act involving the danger of violence to life, limb, or property indictable
under State or Federal Law" and by proposing that specific acts by substituted for this language. Id. at 1-6.
13. Senate Bill 1861 was included in Title IX of Senate Bill 30, which Senator McClellan
introduced in 1969. Note, supra note 11.
14. These revisions, thought to be minor at the time, provided a private treble damages
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commonly referred to as the RICO Act was signed by President
Nixon on October 15, 1970.'1
There have been various amendments to the RICO Statute since its
enactment. Of these, the most significant was implemented in 1984,
when Congress expanded the list of predicate offenses that provide the
basis for a RICO violation. 6 The 1984 amendment also strengthened

remedy in section 1964(c). See Note, supra note 11, at 470 n.22 (RICO as reported out of
House). This amended version of OCCA, which was to include RICO, was met with a most
vociferous dissent from three members of the House Committee on the Judiciary. The use of
RICO, specifically its private treble damage remedy in section 1964(c), was criticized for its
potential for abuse as a tool of harassment against competitors and, significantly, its potential
for stimulating adverse publicity for competitors as a result of charges being filed and subsequent litigation. (See discussion on burden of proof, infra at p.41). Despite this criticism, the
report from the Committee on the Judiciary was favorable. See Note cited supra note 11, at
471 n.22. An outspoken critic, Representative Mikva, voiced similar concerns and unsuccessfully tried to amend Senate Bill 30 so that it would allow treble damages where frivolous
lawsuits brought under section 1964(c). Id.
15. The House version of the bill passed Oct. 7, 1970 and was approved by the Senate five
days later. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7,
1.01, at 1-8 n.26.
16. The "predicate offenses" or racketeering activity proscribed by RICO are today defined as:
(1) 'racketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year: (B) any act which is indictable under any of the
following provisions of title 18, United States Code: section 201 (relating to bribery) section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under
section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds), section 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1029 (relative
to fraud and related activity in connection with access devises), section 1084 (relating to
the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section
1343 (relating to wire fraud) sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503
(relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement),
section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513
(relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1951 (relating to
interference with commerce, robbery or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering),
section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section
1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary
instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity), section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire), sections 2251-2252 (relating to
sexual exploitation of children), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation
of stolen property) section 2320 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor
vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sec-
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the ability of the Justice Department to effectuate the criminal forfei17
ture provisions of the Act.
RICO has been met with strong support in Congress, reflected in
the nature of the several amendments. With the legacy of the Reagan

tions 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29
United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor
organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any
offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities,
or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the
United States, or (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989).
Smith and Reed have commented on Congress' use of the terms "chargeable" when referring to state law violation and "indictable" when referring to federal law violation in section
1961.
It is not clear why Congress used the term 'chargeable' when referring to State law violations and the term 'indictable' when referring to Federal law violations. [Probably] ...
because the specific federal offenses were known to be indictable, the more precise term
was applied to them. Because the state offenses were stated generically, the use of the
language 'chargeable' and 'punishable by imprisonment for more than one year' encompassed all offenses that under Federal law would have been indictable felonies, but that
under the procedures of a particular state might not be indictable or designated as felonies. Thus, the terminology chosen was apparently designed to prevent a defendant from
escaping punishment due to a technicality in a particular state's law.
D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 2.02 [1], at 2-4, 5; see also Bradley, Racketeers, Congress,
and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837 (1980). One commentator has
criticized the vague and generic approach of section 1961 (1) (A) to state offenses. The criticism asserts that the federal courts may construe a generic category as broadly as they wish,
thus preventing an individual from receiving fair notice that his behavior is criminal. See
Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 225
n.300 (1980). Numerous challenges to the criminal liability under RICO as void for vagueness
have failed. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 2.02, at 2-6. But see H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4951, 4957-58 (U.S. Jun. 27, 1989) (Scalia, J. concurring)(indicating challenge on basis of vagueness may succeed).
The predicate offenses were further expanded in a 1986 amendment. See Pub. L. 99-570,
100 Stat. 3207-35 (1989); Pub. L. 99-646, 100 Stat. 360 (1986). These amendments expanded
the list of predicate offenses of 18 U.S.C. sections 1956 and 1957 (relating to money laundering) and 18 U.S.C. sections 1512 and 1513 (relating to obstruction of justice) respectively.
Because the money laundering provisions include their own predicate offenses, one commentator has pointed out that the 1986 amendment could significantly expand the scope of RICO.
See D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7,
1.02, at 1-9.
17. For an excellent comprehensive discussion on RICO's criminal forfeiture provisions,

see D. SMITH,

PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES,

chs. 13 & 14 (1987). For

a discussion of the significant points of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, see generally Reed, Criminal Forfeiture under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Raising the
Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 747 (1985). A brief discussion of RICO's criminal forfeiture
provision is included below.
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Administration's anti-crime mandate well settled in the federal judiciary, RICO also has received strong support from the judiciary.
III.

STATUTORY ELEMENTS

The breadth of civil RICO and the ensuing problems posed for the
civil practitioner arise from the courts' complex definitional holdings
regarding the various statutory elements of RICO offenses. Violations
arising under section 1962(c) are by far the most frequently encountered RICO offenses; therefore the section's elements will be the subject of the following analysis. Sections 1962(a) 8 and (b) 1 9 are
infrequently encountered, as will be discussed later. Conspiracy
2 ° require an understanding of the elecounts under section 1962(d)
2
ments of subsection (c).

1

Reduced to its three essential elements, a civil RICO claim must
involve: (1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of racketeeringactivity (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct or control of an enterprise.22 Section 1962(c), the primary workhorse for
civil claims, was intended to prevent the operation of a legitimate
business through racketeering activity. This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprises' affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.23
Accordingly, a violation of section 1962(c) requires "(1) conduct, (2)
18. For the text of section 1962(a), see infra note 88 and accompanying text.
19. For the text of section 1962(b), see infra note 89 and accompanying text.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). Section 1962(d) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
RICO conspiracy charges have been the subject of extensive analysis and are beyond the scope
of this article. For discussions of subsection (d), see D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7,
5.05; Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 383-98 (1983).
21. Analysis of subsection (c) is the subject of this article generally.
22. Delta Truck and Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1988).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). The private treble damages remedy is, of course, the
basis for a civil action under section 1964(c). It provides: "Any person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
For a general discussion of section 1964(c), see generally, Patton, supra note 4.
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of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern of racketeering activity."2 4
IV.

CONDUCT

Section 1961 provides the definitions of the terms used in RICO.25
Unfortunately, "the key phrase, 'to conduct or participate... in the
conduct of [the] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity' is not defined." '2 6 Thus, the required nexus between the unlawful acts of the defendant and the affairs of the enterprise has been
the subject of much judicial debate. While every jurisdiction requires
the unlawful acts to be connected to the affairs of the enterprise in
some fashion, there has been sharp disagreement over the extent to
which the interrelationship must exist.27
Perhaps the most restrictive test is that adopted by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Mandel.28 This test focuses on the degree of
participation by each defendant in the conduct of the affairs of the
enterprise. As the Eighth Circuit explained in Bennett v. Berg,2 9 the
requisite degree "ordinarily will require some participation in the op-

24. Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1987)(quoting
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)). The Fifth Circuit has held that these are
separate requirements. See Old Time Enters. v. International Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213,
1217 (5th Cir. 1989). The collection of unlawful debt will not be included in this analysis. It is
an infrequent aspect of RICO charges involving instead a pattern of racketeering activity. See
D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7,
4.05(1).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982). Other important elements, such as the nexus between the
pattern of racketeering activity and the affairs of the enterprise, are not defined in section 1961
but rather have been judicially implied. See generally Patton, supra note 4, at 407-09. For an

excellent discussion of the nexus, see D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 5.04(3).
26. Patton, supra note 4, at 404.
27. Id. The Fifth Circuit has rejected expressly the requirement that a relationship exist
between the predicate acts. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.)(citing
United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978)); accord United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1136 (1982); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 830 n.47, (5th Cir. 1980). But see
R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985)(two acts of mail fraud
sufficient to constitute pattern because they were related). This subject will be discussed further in the Pattern Section below. The Fifth Circuit has emphasized the relationship between
the unlawful acts and the enterprise as opposed to that between the unlawful acts themselves.
28. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). The defendants in
Mandel had been charged with a section 1962(c) violation involving mail fraud and bribery. A
partnership in a company had been transferred to a state politician (a governor) in return for
political favors. The Fourth Circuit actively interpreted the term "conduct or participate" and
concluded that the possession of a non-management interest was not the same as operating the
business. Id. at 1374.
29. 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
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eration or management of the enterprise itself."'3 °
In United States v. Scotto,3 1 the Second Circuit found that an individual conducts the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity "when (1) one is enabled to commit the predicate
offenses solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that enterprise. "32
The Fifth Circuit was persuaded by this rationale but modified it in
United States v. Cauble.3 3 In Cauble, the court ruled:
A defendant does not 'conduct' or 'participate in the conduct' of a lawful enterprise's affairs, unless (1) the defendant has, in fact, committed
the racketeering acts as alleged; (2) the defendant's position in the enterprise facilitated his commission of the racketeering acts, and (3) the
predicate acts had some effect on the lawful enterprise.34
The court expanded this concept in a footnote, stating that the effect
of the predicate acts "may be direct, such as the deposit of money in
the enterprise's bank account, or indirect, such as the retention of the
enterprise's existing clients." 35
The Cauble court also noted that the prosecution's only burden was
to prove that, in some fashion, the enterprise was affected by the racketeering acts. 36 When a defendant exercises vast control over an enterprise, the court held, "[T]he defendant's connection with the
racketeering acts is also the enterprise's connection.3 7 This is 'con-

30. Id. at 1364. The Eighth Circuit has subsequently adopted the approach of the Fifth
Circuit. See United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950 (8th Cir. 1986).
31. 641 F.2d 47 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981). Scotto involved labor
union officials who were convicted of taking illegal payoffs from businesses employing union
members. On appeal, the defendants contended that the required nexus between the predicate
acts and the affairs of the enterprise had to be analyzed in terms of whether the acts "concerned or related to the operation or management of the enterprise" and "affected the affairs of
the enterprise in its essential management." Id. at 54.
32. Id. at 54. The Scotto test has been adopted by the Third and Ninth Circuits. See
United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982);
Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 195 (9th Cir. 1987).
33. 706 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). Cauble involved
Texas millionaire Rex Cauble and the affairs of his partnership, Cauble Enterprises. This
ranching and land business was found to have been operated in part by the depositing of profit,
derived from marijuana smuggling, into the enterprise's bank accounts. Id. at 1333.
34. Id. at 1333.
35. Id. at 1333 n.24.
36. Id.
37. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1333 n.24
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duct' of a legal enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity."3' 8 Relying on its holding in United States v. Martino,3 9 the court
noted parenthetically that the definition of "conducts" is the "performance of activities necessary or helpful to [the] operation of [the]
enterprise."'
This requirement contrasts with the test adopted by the Eleventh
Circuit in United States v. Carter.4 In Carter, a dairy farm owned by
two of the RICO defendants was used for drug smuggling. The farm
office was used as the communications center for the racketeering activity and the farm employees assisted in the drug smuggling. The
court held that the facilities of the dairy farm, the legitimate enterprise, had been "regularly and repeatedly utilized to make possible the
'42
racketeering activity."
The Carter test's focus on the frequency the enterprise is used in
facilitating the racketeering activity provides a much less certain standard than the Cauble test's focus on the defendant's use of his position within the enterprise to facilitate the racketeering acts.
Commentators have pointed to the superiority of the Cauble test's
clarity, its ease of applicability, and its ostensible requirement of a
greater nexus between the enterprise and the racketeering activity.4 3
They have been equally critical of the deficiencies of the Carter test.
Determining precisely when the frequency of use of an enterprise, and
the extent of that use, constitutes a sufficient nexus appears quite onerous. 44 Furthermore, the frequency of use of an enterprise's property
cannot be controlling by itself, for the mere facts of employment by an
enterprise and the commission of unlawful acts by the employee on
the premises of an enterprise "[do] not establish that the defendant
participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through [the
'4
racketeering acts]. 1

38. Id.
39. 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds on reh'g, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.
1982)(en banc), aff'd sub nom. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
40. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1333 n.24.
41. 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 1526-27; accord United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 935 (1982)(phone messages relayed regularly by nightclub personnel facilitated defendant's drug dealing business sufficient to form nexus).
43. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 5.04 [e].
44. Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 375 (1983).
45. United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197, 199 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd on other
grounds, 625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1980). Dennis has been cited as a classic example of the need
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ENTERPRISE

The RICO "enterprise" element is a strange animal indeed. Section
1961(4) defines an enterprise as including "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
46
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
The concept of an enterprise, and the ensuing litigation regarding its
meaning, have sparked considerable controversy. Entities ranging
from groups of corporations to individual persons have been held to
be enterprises. 7 These decisions have greatly expanded the scope of
for a nexus requirement. Patton, supra note 4, at 405. Dennis involved the collection of usurious loans. The defendant was an autoworker at a General Motors factory and had made the
loans to fellow employees. The charge alleged, amazingly, that the defendant was operating
General Motors through the collection of unlawful debts. The court held that the mere fact of
the geographical nexus alleged did not establish that the defendant participated in the conduct
of the enterprise's affairs through the collection of unlawful debts. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. at
199.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
47. A wide spectrum of entities have been held to be enterprises for purposes of RICO.
See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)(holding broadly that illegitimate as
well as legitimate enterprises encompassed by section 1961(4)); see also United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1089 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1987)(Pennsylvania Department of Revenue's Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes); Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1340
(limited partnership); United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 998 (6th Cir. 1982)(en banc),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072 (1983)(governor's office); United States v. Angelilli, 60 F.2d 23, 31
(2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 955, reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 939 (1982)(New York City
Civil Court); United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 535 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943
(1982)(Louisiana Department of Agriculture); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181,
1191 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982)(city municipal court); United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982)(group of individuals and
corporations); United States v. Kovic, 684 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972
(1982)(city police department); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 660 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982)(cooperative, as legal entity, could be enterprise); United States v.
Dean, 647 F.2d 779, 791 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982)(County Judge's
office); United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896
(1981)(office of State Senator); United States v. Lee Stoller Enters., Inc., 652 F.2d 1313, 1319
(7th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981)(Sheriff's department); United States v.
Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069, 1081 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820 (1980)(group of individuals); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2nd Cir. 1979)(group of corporations); United
States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 1977)(public as well as private entities); Gunther
v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25, 27 (D.C.N.Y. 1982)(estate of decedent); United States v. Vignola,
464 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (E.D. Pa.)(traffic court), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980). This list is, of course, merely illustrative. For a more comprehensive list, see Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO): A Manual for Federal Prosecutors, at 27-29 nn.52-61 (1985). The
RICO enterprise obviously is an extremely broad concept and attorneys can be quite creative
in this area. However, caution should be taken when considering the requirements for an
enterprise.
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RICO, broadening the definition of the enterprise to include wholly
illegitimate criminal associations and legitimate entities with no economic purpose, such as courts and governmental agencies.4"
The most significant case dealing with the enterprise concept is
United States v. Turkette.4 9 In Turkette, the United States Supreme
Court held that the term enterprise encompasses both illegitimate and
legitimate enterprises.5 0 The expansion of this issue was not disruptive to Fifth Circuit enterprise jurisprudence.5
In United States v. Elliott,-2 the Fifth Circuit had emphasized Congress' intent to give enterprise an exceedingly broad meaning.5 3 The

48. See, e.g., Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580; Frumento, 563 F.2d at 1089; Dozier, 672 F.2d at
535.
49. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
50. Id. at 576. The Court resolved a major split in federal appellate authority with its
decision in Turkette. See id. at 578 n.1 (citing cases). It found that nothing in the statutory
language nor the legislative history of RICO provided a basis to limit the concept of an enterprise to solely legitimate organizations. See id. at 576. The Court declared that Congress
could easily have inserted the term "legitimate" had it chosen to narrow the scope of RICO.
See id. at 581. In explaining why the breadth of its interpretation did not eliminate the enterprise element by equating it with the requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity, the
Court stated:
In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the government must prove both the existence of an 'enterprise' and the connected 'pattern of racketeering activity.' The enterprise
is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering is, on the other
hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute . . . The former is proved by
evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various
associates function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite
number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise. While the
proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof of
one does not necessarily establish the other. The 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering activity'; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it
engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate element which
must be proved by the government.
Id. at 582-83. The Turkette decision has been criticized precisely on the basis that it read out of
the statute the enterprise element. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 3.02, at 3-4 (arguing
persuasively that proof of pattern of racketeering activity logically is enough to establish proof
of enterprise under Court's decision).
51. Patton, supra note 4, at 411 n. 184 (citing Fifth Circuit cases and criticisms from other
circuits prior to Turkette).
52. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
53. Id. at 897-98 (quoting United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976)).
Elliott involved a group of six individuals involved in a number of criminal activities ranging
from arson to murder. The Fifth Circuit traced the origins of the dispute over the extent of the
reach of RICO to dicta in Ianelliv. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975). See Elliott, 571 F.2d at
897 n. 17. Elliott is a landmark decision regarding section 1962(d) conspiracy jurisprudence for
its holding that the criminal enterprise is broader in scope than a conspiracy. See id. at 902.
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Court in Elliott anticipated the Supreme Court's ruling in Turkette
when it held: "There is no distinction, for 'enterprise' purposes, between a duly formed corporation that elects officers and holds annual
meetings, and an amoeba-like infra-structure that controls a secret
criminal network." 4 Legitimate enterprises usually are proven adequately by proof of the "legal" existence of the enterprise. 5 However,
the Supreme Court in Turkette stated that an enterprise entirely illegitimate in purpose, or an association-in-fact with no legal existence,
may be demonstrated by proof of an ongoing formal or informal organization, and by proof that the several defendants functioned as a
continuous unit with a common purpose.5 6
The Turkette decision has had a greater impact on criminal RICO
jurisprudence than on civil RICO.5 7 However, because a corporate
defendant may not also be the RICO enterprise,5 8 the civil plaintiff
may reach the "deep pockets" of a corporation by use of the association-in-fact concept derived from Turkette.59

For excellent discussions of Elliott as it relates to conspiracy under RICO and subsequent
court treatment of it, see D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 5.05(2); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 383-98 (1983).
54. Id. at 898; see also United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1192-95 (5th Cir.
1981)(explaining Elliott and citing critical authority), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982).
55. Usually, legitimate enterprises can be proven by production of corporate charters, tax
records, etc.
56. See Patton, supra note 4, at 411 n.184 (citing Fifth Circuit cases decided preTurkette).
57. This is because most civil cases usually involve legitimate businesses and, thus, the
association-in-fact concept approved of in Turkette is not relied upon.
58. See Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc., 802 F.2d 122, at 122-23 (5th Cir. 1986)(citing cases); see also D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 3.07(l)(a), at 3-58 n.2 (citing cases).
Only one circuit does not follow this position. See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 98790 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 815 (1983).
59. The broad interpretation of enterprise is seen in the Fifth Circuit's decision in
R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985). R.A.G.S. involved a scheme to
defraud a company of its sewing machines. One of the defendants was a former president and
stockholder of R.A.G.S. She allegedly formed an enterprise with another defendant who allegedly owned the sewing machines and rented them to the company. Id. at 1351-52. Because
the plaintiff company R.A.G.S. was comprised of only the two remaining stockholders, it was
able to reach the interests owned by the defendants by alleging that the defendants were an
enterprise separate and distinct from the company itself. In finding that the two individual
defendants constituted an enterprise, the Court noted the specific language of section 1961(4).
The Fifth Circuit upheld a lower Court's denial of the defendant's motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment on the association-in-fact issue. Id. at 1353. The district court's findings
concluded that a material question of fact existed as to whether an association in fact was
created by the defendant. The Fifth Circuit relied on "this circuit's broad interpretation of the
definition of 'enterprise' " to affirm the district court's ruling. However, the Fifth Circuit ob-
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VI.

PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY

By far the most complex and controversial of the essential elements
of civil RICO is the "pattern of racketeering activity." Section
1961(5) defines a pattern of racketeering activity as requiring "at least
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten
years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of
a prior act of racketeering activity."'
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,61 the United States Supreme
Court attempted to assist the controversy between the circuit courts
of appeal regarding the pattern issue. In its now-famous footnote
14,62 the Court relied heavily on RICO's legislative history and observed that 63the pattern element required "continuity plus
relationship."
served that the scope of the civil RICO statute is "breathtaking" and concluded by noting that
it was "unfortunate for federal courts to be burdened by this kind of case." Id. at 1355.
The decision in R.A. G.S., while utilizing a broad interpretation of the enterprise element, did
not apply the elements of relationship and continuity to the pattern of racketeering activity as
suggested by the Supreme Court. See Semida, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14
(1985). This issue is discussed further in the section on pattern of racketeering activity, infra
at p.35. The Fifth Circuit has limited the enterprise element by applying the Supreme Court's
ruling in Turkette that the enterprise "function as a continuing unit," where the enterprise
alleged is an association-in-fact. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583; Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank &
Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial
Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1987); Shaffer v. Williams, 794 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir.
1986). In Montesano, an association of two corporate and one individual defendant was found
to lack continuity. Montesano, 818 F.2d at 427. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the alleged
enterprise had to be an entity distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity. The enterprise
had to be "an ongoing organization or be a continuing unit, such that the enterprise has an
existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate act." Id. at 426-27
(citing Atkinson, 808 F.2d at 440-41). Thus, the association-in-fact enterprise, associated for
the sole purpose of repossessing a vessel owned by the plaintiff, lacked continuity. The court in
Montesano was extremely critical of R.A.G.S. and indeed urged that it be overturned en banc.
Id. at 424. The Fifth Circuit's emphasis on continuity in the enterprise element, in the absence
of emphasis on the requirement of continuity in the pattern element, may be subject to alteration due to a recent decision by the Supreme Court in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,

57 U.S.L.W. 4951 (U.S. June 26, 1989).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
61. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
62. Id. at 496 n.14
63. Id. The Court relied on the following statement: "The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a
pattern." Id. But see United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122-23 (2d Cir.)(finding in
legislative history of RICO only temporal requirement of relationship and that pattern of acts
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The Court also recognized the importance of Congress' use of the
term "requires" in the language of section 1961(5), noting that this
implied "that while two acts are necessary they may not be sufficient."' The Court then invited the lower courts to fashion their own
definition of the term pattern as used in section 1961(5)65 and offered
as instruction the definition of pattern in the Special Dangerous Offender statute.66
The lower courts responded to Sedima in several ways, ranging
from consideration of footnote 14 as unpersuasive dictum, to reading
its assertion of the requirements of relationship and continuity as a
requirement of multiple schemes. 67 The relationship prong has been
widely understood to require that the predicate acts are in some fashion related to the affairs of the enterprise. A "common scheme" requirement has arisen as a result of the relationship requirement in
situations involving association-in-fact enterprises.68 Such enterprises
may often be intrinsically related to the commission of the predicate
acts. 69 Therefore, requiring that the predicate acts be committed in
furtherance of a common scheme and relating the offenses to one another gives greater meaning to the relationship requirement in the definition of a "pattern." 7 However, it must be noted that the lower

be related to enterprise), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); see also D. SMITH & T. REED, supra
note 7,
4.02 (1988)(arguing conclusion in Weisman could easily have been reached in
Sedima).
64. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
65. Id. at 500; see also H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4951, 4956
(U.S. June 26, 1989)(Scalia, J., concurring)(observing instruction to lower courts has created
wide split amongst circuits).
66. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
67. H.J., Inc., 57 U.S.L.W. at 4952 n.2 (citing cases).
68. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 4.03 (quoting Bradley, Racketeers, Congress,
and the Courts. An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837, 864 (1980)).
69. Association-in-fact enterprises, for example, may exist solely for the purpose of committing the predicate acts and have no identity apart from their commission.
70. A number of courts have required that the racketeering acts be related to each other
by virtue of a common scheme in order to establish a pattern. See United States v. Brooklier,
685 F.2d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); United States v. Dean,
647 F.2d 779, 791 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982); United States v. Starnes,
644 F.2d 673, 677-78 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601 n.2 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860-61 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613-14
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United
States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 883-84 (E.D. Wis. 1974). A number of other courts have
determined that a pattern could be found if any of two acts of racketeering within ten years of
each other were in some way related to the affairs of the enterprise. See Alcorn County, Miss.
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courts have focused primarily on the continuity requirement of foot-

note 14 in Sedima.7 '
Sedima's continuity requirement and its consequences have been
the point of departure for the differences between the circuits. Most
circuit courts of appeal have treated footnote 14 as persuasive and
72
have inserted the continuity requirement into the pattern element.
The approach adopted by the majority of circuits considers several
factors and is based on a case-by-case analysis. Among the factors
considered are the names of victims, the number of predicate acts, the
time span involved, the seriousness of the offenses committed, and the
number of perpetrators involved. 3 From analysis of these factors, the
circuits find the requisite continuity and relationship.
A highly restrictive requirement maintained by the Eighth Circuit
is that of a multiple scheme.7 4 This approach has been expressly rev. U. S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom.
Robinson v. Tanner, 481 U.S. 1039 (1987); United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517, 1522
(11 th Cir. 1984); United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1261 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 817 (1984); United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 828 (1983), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 830
n.47 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122-23 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Hawkins v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Boffa, 513 F.
Supp. 444, 456 n.16 (D. Del. 1980).
71. The Supreme Court recently has had occasion to discuss the continuity requirement
in the pattern racketeering activity. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 57 U.S.L.W.
4951 (U.S. Jun. 27, 1989). In H.J., Inc., the Court stated:
'Continuity' is both a closed and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of
repeated conduct or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a
threat of repetition ....

It is, in either case, centrally a temporal concept-and particu-

larly in the RICO context, where what must be continuous, RICO's predicate acts or
offenses, and the relationship these predicates must bear one to another, are distinct
requirements.
See id. at 4954 (citing Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39
(3rd Cir. 1987)). However, Justice Scalia found in a concurring opinion that the Court's definition of continuity added nothing to its interpretation of continuity in earlier cases. Id. at
4957 (Scalia, J., concurring).
72. See Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3rd Cir.
1987); International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1987); Medalian
Television Enters. v. SelecTV of California, Inc., 833 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1987); Condict
v. Condict, 826 F.2d 923, 927-29 (10th Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d
970, 976 (7th Cir. 1986).
73. See supra note 72 (citing cases).
74. Terre DuLac Ass'n v. Terra DuLac, Inc., 834 F.2d 148, 149 (8th Cir. 1987). The
position adopted by the Eighth Circuit has its basis in dictum from an Illinois district court
ruling. The Illinois court stated:
Surely the continuity inherent in the term [pattern] presumes repeated criminal activity,
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jected, however, by the United States Supreme Court in H.J, Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 7 5 Justice Brennan, writing for a
unanimous Court, found no support for the multiple schemes approach in either the text of the statute or in its legislative history.76
Because the multiple schemes approach would allow the perpetrators
of numerous predicate offenses in furtherance of a single scheme to go
unpunished under RICO (and, thus, the victims of such scheme to
remain uncompensated for their injuries) the Court stated, "Congress
had a more natural and common sense approach to RICO's pattern
element in mind ... envisioning a concept of sufficient breadth that it
might encompass multiple predicates within a single scheme that were
related and that amounted to, or threatened the likelihood of, continued criminal activity."7 7 Essentially, the Court held what it had previously only noted in footnote 14 of Sedima, namely, that the pattern
of racketeering activity requires both relationship and continuity.7"
Therefore, the Court's ruling in HJ, Inc. rejected the multiple
schemes approach of the Eighth Circuit in favor of the multiple factor
approach 79 articulated in footnote 14 of Sedima. Accordingly, HJ,
Inc. refuted the view "that a pattern is established merely by proving
two predicate acts." 80
The Fifth Circuit in R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt' held that two
not merely repeated acts to carry out the same criminal activity. It places a real strain on
the language to speak of a single fraudulent effort, implemented by several fraudulent
acts, as a 'pattern of racketeering activity.'
See Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Il. 1985).
75. 57 U.S.L.W. 4951 (U.S. Jun. 27, 1989). HJ., Inc. involved allegations by customers
of Northwestern Bell that the respondent had sought to influence members of the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission in the performance of their duties. Id. at 4951-52. The Eighth
Circuit has concluded that the petitioner's failure to allege that similar endeavors had been
engaged in the past by the respondent rendered the allegations insufficient. Id. at 4953.
76. Id. at 4954.
77. Id. at 4952-53.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
80. 57 U.S.L.W. at 4952; see also United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir.
1988); United States v. lanello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3230
(1987); Bank of America v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970-71 (11th Cir. 1986);
R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 744 F.2d 1350, 1354-55 (5th Cir. 1985). Interestingly, the
Supreme Court in H.J., Inc. referred to United States v. Jennings, where the Sixth Circuit
suggested that proof of two predicate acts would be sufficient to establish a pattern. H.J., Inc.
v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4951, 4952-53 (U.S. June 26, 1989); see also Jennings, 824 F.2d at 163. The extent of the impact of H.J., Inc. on the remaining circuits which
adhere to the pre-Sedima definitions of the pattern is yet to be seen.
81. 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
C
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predicate acts were sufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering activity.8 2 In the words of Circuit Judge Wisdom, "[T]he Supreme
Court in Sedima implied that two 'isolated' acts would not constitute
a pattern. In this case, however, the alleged acts of mail fraud are
related.""3
Subsequent decisions of the Fifth Circuit adhered to R.A.G.S., but
criticized it. 4 These cases instead applied a continuity requirement to
the enterprise element."5 Because the precise issue in HJ., Inc. was
the Eighth Circuit's multiple scheme requirement,8 6 the validity of the
comparative effectiveness of a continuity requirement for the enterprise element, absent the imposition of a continuity requirement in the
pattern element, is not a completely settled issue.
VII.

SECTION

1962

Section 1962 sets out four ways in which a RICO violation may
occur. Three provisions provide for substantive violations, and one
provides for conspiracy. Section 1962(a) declares unlawful the use of
income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an
interest in an enterprise. Section 1962(b) forbids the acquisition or
maintenance of an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Subsection (c) prohibits conducting the affairs of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. A conspiracy to
violate the prohibitions set forth in the preceding subsections is proscribed by section 1962(d).
Subsections (a) and (b) strike close to the original purpose of
RICO, namely by prohibiting the infiltration of legitimate business
through illegitimate means. Subsection (c), on the other hand,
uniquely criminalizes the individual who conducts or participates in
an enterprise through illegitimate means. Subsection (d) makes it unlawful to conspire to violate any of the other subsections.8 "
Few cases have been brought under subsections (a) 8 and (b);8 9 vio82. Id. at 1354-55.
83. Id. at 1355 (opinion by Wisdom, J.).
84. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
86. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4951-52 (U.S. June 26, 1989).
87. Patton, supra note 4, at 402.
88. Section 1962(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
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lations of these subsections are usually combined with a subsection (c)
debt in which such person has participated as a principle within the meaning of Section 2,
Title 18, U.S.C. to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which effect, interstate or
foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer,
or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities
of the issuer were held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or
their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful
debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one (1) percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in the law or in fact, the
power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
The uses of section 1962(a) may be increasing. This is because the courts now require that the
"person" and the "enterprise" must be distinct in cases brought under subsection (c). See
cases cited supra note 58. It is not infrequent that a subsection (a) violation will arise from the
investigation of a violation of section 1962(c). In these situations a legitimate enterprise that
has been operated through a pattern of racketeering activity frequently will have money derived from such an operation reinvested into the corrupted business, thus creating a section
1962 (a) violation. See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1335 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 996 (1984); see also D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 5.02[l], at 5-4, 5.
Smith and Reed observe that there does not seem to be a single "pure" section 1962(a) case
involving an organized crime figure infiltrating a legitimate business through the investment of
profits from gambling or other illegal activities. Id. at 5-5.
Section 1962(a) is broad enough to reach such professionals as accountants, attorneys, or
investment counselors who assist "racketeers" in devising ways to invest funds derived from a
pattern of racketeering. United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Loften
involved the activities of a narcotics trafficker in Arizona. Proceeds from the narcotics business had been invested into a goldmining project. The defendant's attorney, Albert Socolov,
was indicted pursuant to section 1962(a). Id. at 843. Allegedly, Socolov had been deeply
involved in the investment scheme. Socolov argued among other things that the statute was
not intended to reach investment advisors. Further, he argued that the statute failed to give
him fair notice that his conduct might subject him to prosecution. Id. Socolov argued that
attorneys who were generally aware of their client's status as racketeers would be required to
investigate the source of their client's income before they could recommend investments. Thus
a chilling effect would be placed on lawyers who were involved in corporate or commercial law
and frequently provided investment advice to their clients. The court, in rejecting these arguments, held that the prosecution would have to "prove that Socolov was aware that the funds
to be invested were the proceeds of narcotics activities and that he had knowledge before he
gave investment advice." Id. at 854. The court concluded that the active involvement of the
attorney in making the investments was far beyond what legal counseling would normally
entail.
In addressing the issue of fair notice, the court stated, "The evidence necessary to establish
Socolov's knowledge of the racketeering activities of other defendants may be circumstantial
evidence of intent and knowledge for the RICO offense." The court observed:
Even if we assume that Socolov did not know that his own conduct was illegal under
RICO, although he knew that the actions of Loften and his associates were illegal, by
assisting them in making their investments (beyond simply giving advice as to the legality
thereof), he ran the risk of being charged as an accessory after the fact.
Id. at 854-56.
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violation. 9° Further, as was noted in a study of 236 RICO indictments, 9 ' approximately thirty percent of the indictments in which
subsections (a) and/or (b) were combined with subsection (c), the (a)
and (b) counts were dismissed or convictions on those counts were
reversed on appeal.9 2 Moreover, the same study concluded that, given
the original congressional intent of preventing the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime, there appeared to be only one successful prosecution under subsections (a) and (b) that conformed to
the intended mold.9 3
Analyzing the difficulties present in establishing the "infiltration"
of legitimate business,9 4 the author of the study found illustrative the
89. Section 1962(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in
or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce.
Section 1962(b) is even less frequently encountered than section 1962(a). See D. SMITH & T.
"
REED, supra note 7, 5.03. Section 1962(b) prosecutions generally involve the 'muscling'
into businesses through loan sharking, bribery, extortion or fraud." Tarlow, RICO Revisited,'
17 GA. L. REV. 291, 323 (1983). The Fifth Circuit has summed up a 1962(b) charge as essentially prohibiting the use of racketeering methods to acquire or maintain an interest in an
enterprise. See United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 955 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983). The Second Circuit in United States v. Jacobson
faced a fact situation illustrative of section 1962(b) offenses. 691 F.2d 110 (2nd Cir. 1982).
The defendant had made a series of usurious loans to a financially troubled bagel bakery. As
security for one of the loans, the defendant received an assignment of the bakery's lease. The
court held that this assignment constituted the acquisition of an interest in the bakery in violation of section 1962(b). See id. at 113. The court also held that the defendant exercised control over the bakery and that such control while clear to the Court after the defendant evicted
the proprietor and purchases the bakery's fixtures at an IRS auction, could have been inferred
simply from the changing of the locks on the bakery by the defendant and his direct use of
money from the registers to cover the debts owed him. See id. at 112.
90. For the text of section 1962(c), see supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
91. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal,87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 724 (1987).
92. Professor Lynch surveyed all reported criminal RICO cases decided in the Courts of
Appeals through 1985. Two hundred thirty-six of the indictments contained enough underlying facts to provide a basis for determining use patterns of the criminal provisions of RICO.
Id. at 713-64. See generally Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor
Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 356 (1980)(indicating section 1962(a) is rarely
used). By the end of 1984 the Justice Department had reported to Congress that approximately 500 RICO cases had been brought. Lynch, RICO.- The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 661, 724 n.265 (1987).
93. Lynch, supra note 91, at 726-27; see also United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414, 416
(2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978). Gambino involved several defendants who
operated on behalf of a mafia family in exercising control over the affairs of a private sanitation collection business in the Bronx.
94. The issue of determining when infiltration has occurred is central to both section
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Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Cauble.9 ' In Cauble, the

court upheld a conviction of a subsection (a) violation, coupled with a
violation of subsection (c). Proceeds from the sale of marijuana had
been invested in a real estate and ranching partnership. This enterprise (the partnership), however, also was operated through a pattern
of racketeering activity (the marijuana business). Thus, the study's
author argued that Cauble represented the use of a legitimate business
as a front for drug trafficking, rather than representing the infiltration
of a legitimate enterprise by criminal elements.96
The Fifth Circuit in Cauble rejected the defendant's contention that
the more than $1 million deposited into the enterprise's bank account
had to be traced specifically to the particular marijuana sales.9 7 The
court held, "[T]he prosecution need only prove that the illegally derived funds flowed into the enterprise; it need not follow a trail of
specific dollars from a particular criminal act." 98 The court's formulation stopped short of requiring a showing that actual racketeering
funds were invested in the enterprise. This holding, combined with an
emerging consensus that corporate deep pockets may be reached in
cases brought under subsection (a), 99 and a desire by plaintiffs to

avoid difficulties associated with subsection (c) counts, had made the
uses of subsection (a) a more promising proposition in the federal
courts generally.
While subsection (a) indictments may thus enjoy some increased
use, indictments arising under subsection (b) still are relatively
1962(a) and (b). The issue has no bearing on section 1962(c) which involved the operation of
an enterprise.
95. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
96. See Lynch, supra note 91, at 728 n.282. Cauble, therefore, should have been brought
under subsection (c) rather than subsection (a).
97. The issue of the extent to which the funds must be traced in a section 1962(a) violation is still unclear. Only two decisions are on point. See Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1343 (funds
must be traced specifically to sales of illegal goods); United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621,
629 (7th Cir. 1980)(legitimate funds considered traced when shown to be invested in enterprise
by receipt of defendant's racketeering income). But see D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7,

5.02[5] (arguing need for tracing is obviated by Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the statute).
Any individual who had acquired income from racketeering would be subject to 1962(a) liability upon investing in any legitimate business on the theory that the racketeering income had

allowed the investment to be made. Id.
98. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1342 [emphasis added].
99. This applies also to section 1962(b) cases. In both situations it must be shown that
the racketeering income benefited the corporate defendant. See D. SMITH & T. REED, supra
note 7, T 3.07[l][a], at 3-59 n.4 (citing cases).
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rare. Ioo Case law interpreting the language of subsection (b) also provides little insight.
In United States v. Martino,"I the Fifth Circuit analyzed an indictment pursuant to subsection (b) and concluded that the subsection
sought to prohibit the use of racketeering methods to infiltrate a legitimate business.3 10 2 One writer has termed these racketeering efforts
"muscling,"'
which means acquiring or maintaining an interest in
an enterprise. °4
While prosecutors and plaintiffs' counsel have rarely used the infiltration subsections of section 1962, subsection (c), the operation subsection, has been used extensively. 0 As such, it has provided the
greatest source of analysis and interpretation for the courts. It has
also been the greatest source of wariness and uncertainty for the civil
practitioner. 0 6
In United States v. Elliott, 0 7 the Fifth Circuit confronted the scope
of a subsection (c) indictment with its use of the term associated with.
The court held:
The substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute apply to insiders and
outsiders - those merely 'associated with' an enterprise - who participate directly and indirectly in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity. Thus the RICO net is woven tightly to trap
even the smallest fish, those peripherally involved with the

100. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
101. 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'don other grounds on reh'g, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.
1982)(en banc), aff'd sub nom. Russello v. United States, 465 U.S. 16 (1983).
102. Id. at 381-82.
103. Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 323 (1983).
104. Id. While section 1962(b) is not the subject of any extensive analysis within this
article, it is important to note the differing nexus requirement for section 1962(b) as opposed to
1962(c). The nexus requirement of section 1962(b) requires a relationship between the "racketeering activity and the acquisition or maintenance of an interest in or control of the enterprise.
...It is essentially a simple cause and effect relationship, i.e., it requires a showing that the
racketeering activity resulted in or at least facilitated, the defendant's acquisition or maintenance of an interest in or control of the enterprise." See D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7,
5.03, at 11 (citing VonBulow By Auersperg v. VonBulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1307 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)).

105. See D.

SMITH

& T.

REED,

supra note 7,

5.01, at 5-2 (section 1962(c) most often

charged in RICO cases); see also Lynch, supra note 91, at 731 (most RICO cases in study of

such cases involved section 1962(c) violations); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L.

REV.

291,

324 (1983)(section 1962(c) frequently litigated).

106. Formulating adequate pleading on the various elements of a section 1962(c) allegation is by far the most difficult hurdle for the civil practitioner to overcome.
107. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
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. enterprise. 0

This liberal interpretation, in line with Congress' provision for a liberal construction of RICO generally,"° has made subsection (c) a potent offensive weapon in civil litigation. It has been noted that those
found to be associated with an enterprise may include auditors, independent accountants, lenders, contractors, and customers." 0 Indeed, anyone who is aware of the existence of the enterprise, and
participates in any way with the pattern of racketeering activity, can
be found to be associated with the enterprise."'
The Fifth Circuit further expanded the scope of subsection (c) in
R.A.G.S.,112 when it held that only a minimal effect on interstate
commerce is required.' '3 While this is easily demonstrated in situations involving legitimate enterprises, those cases involving illegitimate enterprises require a showing that the racketeering acts

108. Id. at 903. While this is the majority position, a minority view requires that some
involvement in the operation or management of the enterprise be demonstrated. See, e.g.,
Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1316, 1364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983)(some participation in affairs of enterprise ordinarily will be required); United States v. Bledsoe, 674
F.2d 647, 663 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982)(association with enterprise must be
distinct from participation in conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity,
such as formal membership or employment); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375
(4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980)(some involvement in operation or management of enterprise required). But see D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 5.04[1], at 5-16 n.5
(indicating minority position may no longer be followed today).
109. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947
(1970). The text states: "The provisions of this Title [enacting this chapter and amending
sections 1505, 2516, and 2517 of this Title] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. For a discussion of the liberal construction clause in RICO, see Note,
RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980); see also Tarlow,
RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 308-311 (1983). Interestingly, the vast majority of the
states have adopted either a fair import or liberal construction clause. For a collection of the
statutes and relevant decisions, see Blakey, RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context.- Reflections
On Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 245 n.25 (1982).
110. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 5.04[l], at 5-16 n.6.
111. Id. at 5-17.
112. 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
113. Id. at 1353 (citing United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980)). R.A.G.S. was not the first to hold that the impact on interstate
commerce would only have to be minimal. Eg., United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778, 781
(6th Cir. 1985); United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 783 (7th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 464 U.S. 979 (1983); United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 781 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983); United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 892 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982); United States v. Allen, 656 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1075 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224,
233-34 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981).
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themselves, as opposed to the legitimate business, affect interstate

commerce. 114

The courts have uniformly held that a nexus must exist between the
racketeering activity and the affairs of the enterprise in order to establish a violation of subsection (c). 115 The courts also have been in substantial agreement concerning whether there must be some benefit to
the enterprise as a result of the illegal acts. Some courts, however,
have clearly rejected the benefit requirement' 1 6 and instead demand
that some effect on the enterprise must be shown.'
VIII.

BURDENS OF PROOF

One of the most important debates about this legislation concerns
the burden of proof required of civil RICO plaintiffs." 8 The issue
before the lower courts is, in a general sense, one of fairness; that is,
civil RICO defendants perceive the statute as patently unfair because
of the lower burden of proof requirement."i 9 Civil defendants claim
114. R.A.G.S., 774 F.2d at 1353.
115. See D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 5.04, at 5-21. This issue should not be
confused with the question of whether the predicate acts must be related to one another in
order to form a pattern of racketeering activity. See section on pattern of racketeering activity
supra at p.3 5 .
116. E.g., United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1333 n.24 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United
States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); United
States v. Kovic, 684 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982); United States
v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 990-91 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170, 1183 (1983);
United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.s. 935
(1982); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 57 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981).
117. E.g., Ellison, 793 F.2d at 950; Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1333 n.24; United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 861 n.15 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
118. The RICO statute does not expressly provide for a particular burden of proof to be
used in civil proceedings. The limited discussion of the issue in the legislative history dealt
with the extent to which a lower standard of proof would contribute to civil trial convictions.
See Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO In The Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling",
19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 715 n.416 (1982)(favorable judgments may be facilitated by lower
civil standard of proof). Representative Poff, for example, emphasized establishing a lower
burden of proof for civil cases. Excerpts from the Congression Record regarding consideration
of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 in the House suggest that the preponderance standard was intended for burden of proof. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7,
8.03, at 8-6, 8. The lack of discussion of the issue in the statute itself or its legislative history is
not surprising because the courts traditionally have established burdens of proof for particular
claims. Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO In The Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling", 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 715 n.420 (1982).

119. The majority view of the lower courts favors a preponderance of the evidence stan-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University,

23

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [], No. 1, Art. 4

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:23

that since the offending conduct is described by reference to criminal
statutes, plaintiffs should be required to establish the allegedly offensive conduct by these same criminal standards, i.e., by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, or at a minimum, proof by clear and convincing
evidence, before a finding of liability can be imposed upon them in a
private civil action.
In Addington v. Texas,' 21 the United States Supreme Court ob-

served that three standards of proof are recognized at law: proof beyond a reasonable doubt, proof by clear and convincing evidence, and
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.' 2' The Court stated:
The function of a standard of proof as that concept is embodied in the
Due Process Clause and in the realm of fact finding, is to 'instruct the
fact finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular
type of adjudication' . . . .The standard serves to allocate the risk of
error between the litigants and to
indicate the relative importance at22
tached to the ultimate decision.'
The Court also stated that the concern to society in the outcome of

a civil case involving a monetary dispute is minimal and the preponderance standard allows the individual litigants to "share the risk of
error in roughly equal fashion."' 23 However, because the interests of
a criminal defendant are of such magnitude, the use of the reasonable
dard of proof. See, e.g., Cullin v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 731 (2nd Cir. 1987); Wilcox v. First
Interstate of Oregon, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 1987); Armco Industrial Credit Corp.
v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Local 560 Int'l Bd.
of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 279-80 n. 12 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 Supreme Court 2247

(1986).
120. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
121. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24. In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court further
observed that most civil disputes are governed by the preponderance standard. Id. The Court
also noted, however, that in a variety of situations the intermediate standard of a clear unequivocal and convincing standard of proof has been utilized to protect particularly important
individual interests. Further, the Court stated that this standard typically is used in cases
involving civil allegations of fraud. Id. at 424. This is highly relevant as the majority of the
civil cases brought under RICO involve the predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, or securities fraud. Interestingly, most states imposed the clear and convincing standard of proof for
fraud allegations. See Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 533 (9th

Cir. 1987)(Boochever, J. dissenting)(citing C.

MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

§§ 959-965 (3rd ed. 1984)). But see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491
(1985)(criminal conduct punishable only upon proof beyond reasonable doubt also can merit
civil sanctions upon preponderance of evidence).
122. Id. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring)).
123. Id.
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doubt standard creates a situation in which "society imposes almost
the entire risk of error upon itself."' 2 4
In its discussion of the intermediate standard of proof, the clear and
convincing evidence standard, the Court observed that it typically is
used in civil cases where fraud is alleged.' 2 5 Significantly, the Court
noted: "The interests at stake in those cases are deemed more substantial ... and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the
defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof." ' 6
It is not unique for a statute to have criminal penalties, 2 7 and it is
firmly established that criminal charges must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the RICO statute permits a civil plaintiff to
accuse his defendant of "racketeering activities" and certain predicate
offenses without that defendant ever having been indicted or, in most
cases, ever having become the focus of any law enforcement investigation or inquiry. Further, if the plaintiff does obtain a judgement, this
could be construed as a judicial finding that the defendant is a racketeer. The difficulties here are exacerbated by the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima,"28 which indicated that although the issue of the
correct burden of proof was not before it, and therefore not decided,' 2 9 the statute requires only a preponderance of the evidence.'
A higher standard of proof has heretofore been required for fraud
allegations because state common law generally has considered fraud
to be quasi-criminal conduct that is actionable both civilly and criminally. 1 31 Sedima has effectively prevented the use of this traditional,

124. Id.
125. Addington v. United States, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979); cf. supra note 121.
126. Id.
127. The classic example is, of course, the antitrust laws, after which civil RICO was
patterned.
128. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
129. Id. at 491.
130. Id. at 492.
131. The Supreme Court first used the term "quasi-criminal" in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). For a discussion of the quasi-criminal nature of a civil RICO claim,

see Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest; "Everybody's Darling", 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 707-09 (1982). At least one court has indicated that civil RICO
actions are quasi-criminal in nature. See Page v. Moseley, Hallgarton, Estabrook & Weeden,
806 F.2d 291, 298 (1st Cir. 1986). Page involved a group of investors who sued their broker

and his brokerage firm and the alleged RICO violations. The defendants moved to compel
arbitration on the RICO allegations. The district court, finding the law favoring arbitration
unclear, dismissed the motion. Id. at 293. On appeal, the First Circuit held the RICO claim
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heightened standard of proof even in cases where mail and/or wire
frauds are urged as the predicate offenses. 32 It would appear that this
is one of the primary factors behind the increase of civil RICO filings.
Under Sedima, a state common law fraud allegation may now be instantly transformed into a federal racketeering allegation that requires
a less stringent standard of proof. In addition, the federal racketeering allegation goes a long way towards defaming the defendant in the
33
process.
to be non-arbitrable and vacated with instructions to stay litigation on the RICO claim pending arbitration on another issue in the case. In finding the RICO claim non-arbitrable, the
First Circuit concluded that a civil RICO suit was quasi-criminal in nature. In a footnote, the
court found that the Supreme Court in Sedima had acknowledged such a risk with its statement that "to the extent an action under Section 1964(c) might be considered quasi-criminal,
requiring protections normally applicable only to criminal proceedings, the solution is to provide those protections." Id. at 298 n.12 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
493 (1985)).
132. While the Supreme Court in Sedima reserved the issue of the requisite standard of
proof for civil RICO cases, all subsequent courts which have confronted the issue have held
that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491; see also
cases cited supra note 119; accord Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 975,
1001 (D. Minn. 1986); Bosteve, Ltd. v. Marauszwski, 642 F. Supp. 197, 202 n.7 (E.D.N.Y.
1986). But see Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 532 (9th Cir.
1987)(Boochever, J., dissenting)(advocating higher standard of clear and convincing evidence);
Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the PublicInterest; "Everybody's Darling," 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 655, 715-18 (1982)(arguing persuasively that clear and convincing standard
should be applied); ABA, Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force 384 (1985)(arguing in
favor of applying reasonable doubt standard to predicate acts). The position of the ABA has
found favorable support in at least one court of appeals. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)(asserting in dicta that reasonable doubt standard applied to predicate acts).
133. The term racketeer carries with it a negative connotation which places a stigma on
the convicted individual. Indeed, given today's press, a conviction is not even necessary for the
stigma to be attached and defamation to occur. On the issue of stigma, see D. SMITH & T.
REED, supra note 7, 8.03, at 8-8 (concluding Supreme Court's decision in Sedima indicates
civil RICO liability has at least the stigma of a finding of fraud); Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick,
Civil RICO in the Public Interest; "Everybody's Darling", 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 716
(1982)(stigma attaches to civil RICO finding of nexus to organized crime); Note, Enforcing
CriminalLaws Through Civil Proceedings;Section 1964 of the Organized Crime ControlAct of
1970, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (1975)(protection of defendant from unnecessary stigmatization may require stricter standard of proof); American Bar Ass'n Criminal Justice Section,
A Comprehensive Perspective on Civil and Criminal RICO Legislation and Litigation, Report
to the House of Delegates, Appendix A, 3-4 (1982)(recommending, among other things, replacement of the pejorative phrase racketeering activity).
The ABA report commented:
The recommended language 'criminal activity' replaces the pejorative term 'racketeering
activity' of existing law. The present law brands the accused as a racketeer with a resulting prejudicial impact on judges and juries. This stigma is particularly unfair since RICO
is not applied solely to racketeers or offenses committed by racketeers but has also been
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In fact, this was essentially the position of the Second Circuit when
it affirmed the district court's dismissal in Sedima.'34 The circuit
ruled that private action could proceed only against a defendant who
had already been convicted of a predicate act or of a RICO violation.13 5 In so concluding, the circuit court stated that it:
[fleared that any other construction would raise severe Constitutional
questions, as it would provide civil remedies for offenses criminal in
nature, stigmatize defendants with the appellation 'racketeer,' authorize
the award of damages, which are clearly punitive, including attorney
in part to avoid the Constitufees, and constitute a civil remedy aimed
36
tional protections of the criminal law'
The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's view as not being
"so close to the Constitutional edge."' 3 7 The Supreme Court went on
to state:
A civil RICO proceeding leaves no greater stain than do a number of
other civil proceedings. Furthermore, requiring conviction of the predicate acts would not protect against an unfair imposition of the "racketeer label." If there is a problem with stigmatizing a garden variety

applied to businessmen and politicians engaged in criminal conduct unrelated to traditional notions of organized crime. When the defendant is charged with an invalid RICO
count, the Eighth Circuit has held that it must be reversed even where the sentence on the
RICO count runs concurrently to the other counts because of the 'stigma' attached to the
'racketeering terminology.'
There is no proper advantage to the government from 'racketeering' language which
results in retrials solely because of its prejudicial impact. In view of the unnecessary
prejudicial effect of the 'racketeering' language, this proposal replaces that terminology
with the phrase 'criminal activity.'
American Bar Ass'n Criminal Justice Section, A Comprehensive Perspective on Civil and
Criminal RICO Legislation and Litigation, Report to the House of Delegates, Appendix A, 4
(1982). Thus, the stigma is not only at the societal level but also found within the courts and
can have a tremendous prejudicial effect on the trial process. This clearly raises due process
issues as well as torts arising in defamation.
The minority position in the ABA report argued that judges and juries had little difficulty in
distinguishing between charges and proof. The "brand" of the racketeering label, it was argued, did not apply until conviction. At that point, the label was appropriate, and thus, there
was no need to prohibit its use. Id.
134. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 485 (2nd Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S.
479 (1985).
135. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 485. The Court noted that the appellate court "observ[ed] that
its prior conviction requirement would avoid serious Constitutional difficulties, the danger of
unfair stigmatization, and problems regarding this standard by which the predicate acts were
to be proved." Id.
136. Id. at 492 (quoting 741 F.2d 482, 500 n.49 (1984)).
137. Id.
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defrauder by means of a civil action, it is not reduced by making certain
138
that the defendant is guilty of fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Fifth Circuit has interpreted Sedima, in dicta, in Armco Industrial Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co. 131 In Armco, the court found
that the preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient to prove
the criminal elements of a civil RICO charge.' 40 The court stated,
"We are reluctant to inject another judicial construct into a statute
that we are commended to construe broadly."' 4 '
The Fifth Circuit is in line with virtually all post-Sedima holdings
on the issue of the appropriate burden of proof.' 42 A number of commentators have advocated the use of a clear and convincing evidence
standard. 4 3 Few commentators, however, support bifurcating the
standards of proof applied in civil RICO and incorporating a reasonable doubt standard for the criminal element of the offense." The
courts have been even more reluctant to assert such a position. 45 In
the absence of congressional action, it appears as though the preponderance of the evidence standard will remain intact for civil RICO for
some time to come.
IX.

DISCOVERY

Because of the dual civil and criminal nature of RICO, the discovery process presents some unique issues for the civil practitioner.
These issues include the assertion of the fifth amendment 146 and access to grand jury materials in the context of RICO.
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all
138. Id. This statement by the Court has been interpreted as a tacit recognition of at least
the risk of a stigma being attached to a civil RICO conviction. See supra note 131. The Court
long ago recognized the detriment a criminal charge presents to the defendant. See In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1967)(indicating further that nature of underlying offense is
relevant).
139. 782 F.2d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 1986).
140. Id. at 481.

141. Id.
142. Id. See generally cases cited supra note 119 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 132.
144. Mixed burdens of proof have been approved by the Supreme Court in libel cases.
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964)(public official plaintiff to prove libel
must show defendant acted with actual malice).
145. See supra note 132.

146. U.S. Const. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides: "No person .. . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ......
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relevant information, or information reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence, may be obtained by a party for
use in a civil proceeding.' 4 7 However, Rule 26 also indicates that
privileged information may not be acquired. 4 Thus, the assertion of
the fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimination may
affect the civil discovery process.' 9

Civil RICO often involves parties not recognized as natural persons
protected by the fifth amendment. 50 The Supreme Court, in Boyd v.
United States,'5' an 1886 case, observed that privacy of the individual
was the central purpose of the fifth amendment privilege. In subsequent cases, the Court has determined that only a "natural individ-

ual" is protected by the privilege. 5 2 Therefore, corporations cannot
15 3
invoke the privilege in civil RICO actions.
A section 1962(c) violation, involving the operation of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, will almost undoubtedly
entail the production of documents and this production may be of a
testimonial nature.' 54 Moving away from the traditional analysis fo147. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
148. Id. at (b)(4)(A)-(C).
149. The Federal Rules and the Constitution protect parties from compulsory discovery
in civil action where there is a risk of self incrimination. Baker v. Limber, 647 F.2d 912, 916
(9th Cir. 1981). In civil cases the fifth amendment may be asserted at the pleading, discovery,
or trial stage. National Acceptance Co. of Amer. v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir.
1983). For a discussion of the fifth amendment privilege in civil RICO proceedings, see D.
SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 7.03 [2][a]-[b]. Practitioners should be aware of the sanctions applicable under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should a court hold
that a party's privilege claims are groundless. See Baker, 647 F.2d at 917-18 (discussing array
of sanctions under Rule 37 for party's groundless claims of privilege).
150. See cases cited supra note 47 and accompanying text.
151. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
152. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 379-85 (1910)(explaining and citing
cases for proposition that corporations cannot invoke fifth amendment). The Supreme Court
has specifically held that corporations, unincorporated associations, labor unions, and partnerships are prohibited from invoking the fifth amendment privilege. E.g., Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1974)(partnership cannot invoke privilege); Curcio v. United
States, 354 U.S. 118, 122-23 (1957)(labor unions cannot invoke privilege); Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (195 1)(political party as unincorporated association cannot invoke
privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944)(observing historic function of
fifth amendment protection was to protect natural individual from compulsory incrimination);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906)(corporations cannot invoke privilege). But see Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 405-14 (1976)(indicating shift in fifth amendment analysis of
compelled document production from inquiry into status of party to incriminating nature of
act of production).
153. Hale, 201 U.S. at 70.
154. The Supreme Court held in Fisher v. United States, that if the act of production was
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cusing on the status of the party invoking the fifth amendment, the
Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States ' set forth a three-part test
for the compelled production of documents that focused on the in-

criminating nature of the act of production itself. The Court asserted
that the act of production: (1) must be testimonial in character, (2)
must be compelled, and (3) must be incriminating before the privilege
will be allowed. 15 6 Thus the private individual's status has changed in

regard to documents, and the previous inapplicability of the privilege
to corporate documents may be undermined if it can be shown that
the act of production is testimonial in character.

57

It should be noted that the corporate defendant may be required to
produce documents by appointment of an agent who would not face
the risks of incrimination. 15' Furthermore, in cases involving the gov-

testimonial in nature, the documents produced may be protected. 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976).
The Court reaffirmed this position in United States v. Doe. 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984).
A section 1962(c) violation frequently will involve a legitimate enterprise and a variety of
records and/or documents may be required to be produced for purposes of the proceedings.
Even in situations involving association-in-fact enterprises in section 1962(c) violations, plaintiffs will be interested in acquiring any records which the enterprise may have kept regarding
its affairs.
155. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
156. Id. at 410-11. Fisherinvolved a taxpayer's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege
against the production of accountant's work papers held by attorneys. The Court, after applying its three-part test, did not consider whether the actual act of production was testimonial.
The Court, rather, concluded that the testimonial aspects of production were a foregone conclusion. Id. The testimonial nature of the act of production generally is understood as either
an acknowledgment of the authenticity of the documents themselves, an indication of responsiveness to the summons, or that the documents are possessed by the defendant. Id.; see also
Doe, 465 U.S. at 611 n.7 (affirming applicability of Fisher'sthree-part privilege analysis). For a
general discussion of Fisher, see Height, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and DocumentsCutting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439 (1984).
157. The Act of Production Doctrine established in Fisher,which took root in Doe, raises
a number of unresolved issues including continued protection for individual private records
and the exclusion of the privilege for corporate records. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7,
7.03, at 7-26; see also Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 40-4 (1986)(Doe and Fisher decisions have
altered traditional assumptions about inapplicability of fifth amendment privilege to
corporations).
158. Generally, when corporate officers decide to claim their fifth amendment privileges,
an uninvolved custodian of records must be furnished to produce and identify the records.
Should no one in the employ of the corporation be available, an entirely new agent with no
previous connection to the corporation could be appointed either by the corporation itself or
by the Court. This would seemingly lead to the conclusion that there is no situation in which
the fifth amendment would prevent a corporation from producing corporate records. See
United States v. Sancetta, 788 F.2d 67, 74-75 (2nd Cir. 1986)("even were it to incriminate him,
another agent could be appointed by Sancetta Corp. or by the court to produce the records");
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ernment, a grant of immunity may overcome an assertion of the privilege.' 5 9 The availability of immunity in a private action still is an
unsettled issue. 160 Private civil plaintiffs may benefit greatly from
materials discovered from grand jury proceedings of parallel criminal
proceedings. While there is a burden of secrecy to overcome in acquisition of grand jury materials, 6 1 the Supreme Court in Douglas Oil
Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest 162 allowed for limited disclosure of
grand jury transcripts in an antitrust setting. 163 The Court required
that disclosure be allowed only after a showing of a "particularized
need" for the information, in order to avoid a possible injustice in
another proceeding." 4 Beyond this requirement of avoidance of in-

In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Thirteen Corporations, 775 F.2d 43, 46 (2nd Cir.
1985)(fifth amendment cannot protect corporation from being compelled to produce documents), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum,
769 F.2d 52, 6 (2nd Cir. 1985)(corporation has no fifth amendment privilege).
159. See United States v. Porter, 711 F.2d 1397, 1404 (7th Cir. 1983). The government,
of course, is not required to give immunity for production purposes and would only do so
under circumstances where production is necessary. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605,
616-17 (1984).
160. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 261 n.20, (1983). Thus, in the civil
setting the testimonial character of document production, absent immunity, will be sufficient
for invoking the fifth amendment privilege. There are other methods which a party can employ to overcome the obstacle of the fifth amendment when it is asserted by a natural person.
First, the party can be made to justify its assertion. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 N. 13; United States
v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913, 919 (2nd Cir. 1984). Second, a deposition can be insisted upon.
Because the assertion of the privilege must be made on a question by question basis, ultimately
some questions will have to be answered. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Selby Mfg. Co., 841
F.2d 1204, 1213-14 (8th Cir. 1973). Third, the existence of a prior waiver of a fifth amendment
privilege at an administrative hearing or in a related proceeding, may be of assistance. Waivers
however will be inferred only in the most compelling of circumstances. Klein v. Harris, 667
F.2d 274, 288 (2nd Cir. 1981); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Jupiter Dev. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 110, 114
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). But see United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 45 (2nd Cir. 1979)(waiver in
one proceeding may not affect rights in subsequent proceeding), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905
(1980). For a discussion of these and other alternatives, see Heidt, The Conjurer'sCircle-The
Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L. J. 1062 (1982).
161. Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that all matters occurring before the Grand Jury must be kept secret. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). Furthermore, there
has been a tradition of keeping grand jury proceedings secret. Rule 6 also requires that the
disclosure of federal grand jury material to a private party may be obtained by the filing of a
petition in the district in which the grand jury convened. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D); see also
Illinois v. Abbott & Assoc., 460 U.S. 557, 572 n.28 (1983); Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D.
427, 433 (D.D.C. 1984).
162. 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
163. Id. at 223.
164. Id. at 222. Furthermore, the Court required "that their request [be] structured to
cover only material so needed." Id.
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justice, a balancing of the need for disclosure, as opposed to the need
for secrecy, must also occur. 165
Several other points regarding discovery merit brief mention. In
camera inspection of documents may provide the necessary recourse
for plaintiffs or defendants in civil RICO. 166 Attorneys should also be
cognizant of the general uses of the doctrine of res judicata (issue and
claim preclusion).

167

Also, because of the crime-fraud exception to

16
both. the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine,
attorney debriefing memoranda regarding a witness' grand jury appearance may be available. 169 Finally, because non-parties (particularly the government) may seek disclosure of discovery materials,
attorneys should attempt to obtain protective orders for materials
they wish to protect. 7 °

165. When disclosure of grand jury materials is sought purely for discovery purposes, the
need for disclosure will not overcome the need for secrecy. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 697
F.2d 511, 512 (3rd Cir. 1982). The Fifth Circuit has ruled that when the Grand Jury is still
investigating, the need for secrecy is paramount. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 613 F.2d
501, 505 (5th Cir. 1980); see also In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir.
1986).
166. In camera inspection of grand jury materials by district courts for purposes of making disclosure decisions has been approved by several circuit courts. D. SMITH & T. REED,
supra note 7, 7.03(3), at 7-33 (citing cases).
167. The term res judicata refers to the two different preclusion defenses of collateral
estoppel and res judicata. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 9.02, at 9-16. For a discussion of collateral estoppel, see generally Thau, CollateralEstoppel and the Reliability of Criminal Determinations. Theoretical, Practical,and Strategic Implications for Criminal and Civil
Litigation, 70 GEO. L. J. 1079 (1982). For a specific discussion of the uses of collateral estoppel in civil RICO actions, see D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, at 9.02, at 9-14, 9-26; see
also Ginger, The Use of Collateral Estoppel in Private Civil RICO Actions, 54 TENN. L. REV.
31 (1985).
168. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805
F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the crime fraud exception, see generally
Silbert, The Crime-Fraud Exception, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351 (1986).
169. D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 7.03[3], at 7-34. Smith and Reed indicate that
private litigants have not had much success in obtaining such memoranda. Id. (citing Harper
& Roe Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)).
170. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party, upon a showing of
good cause, to obtain a protective order preventing disclosure of discovery to non-parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). In Martindell v. ITT Corp., the Second Circuit enforced a protective
order and denied the government access to discovery. 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979). The
case involved civil depositions which had been taken under a court-approved stipulation. The
stipulation provided that only the parties and their counsel could have access to transcripts
and that these transcripts were not to be used for any purpose other than the preparation for,
and conduct of, the litigation. In a request made by telephone and in a letter to the district
court, the government attempted to acquire the transcripts for use in its investigation of possible federal criminal violations by certain deponents. Id. at 292-93. In a footnote to the opin-
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No discussion of RICO, regardless of its depth, would be sufficient
without mention of RICO's broad provisions for forfeiture. Under
section 1963(a)(3), "[A]ny property constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity" may be forfeited in criminal RICO proceedings.",'
The import of this provision arises from the logical reality that once a
criminal conviction is acquired, there simply may be no remaining
assets that the plaintiff can seek through a damage award.
The extent of forfeiture under RICO may be illustrated by the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Cauble. 72 While only $400,000 of illegal assets
had been infused into the limited partnership of Cauble Enterprises,
the government sought forfeiture of over $50 million in assets accumulated by the defendant, Rex Cauble. 7 3 After convictions for violations of section 1962(a) and (c), the government secured Cauble's
17 4
entire general partnership interest.
Because corporations may join together to form association-in-fact

ion, the court stated, "We are not called upon in the present case to decide whether the
government might be entitled to enforcement of a subpoena compelling production of the depositions." Id. at 296 n.6. Compare United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 422-23 (2d
Cir.)(refusing to enforce "protective order" and distinguishing Martindell), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1215 (1983) with Palmieri v. State of New York, 779 F.2d 861, 866 (2d Cir. 1985)(denying demands of state Attorney General and enforcing protective order). Martindell, therefore,
appears to offer some protection to witnesses by virtue of the protective order in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(c).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1982). Congress clarified criminal forfeiture law with the
passage of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 as part of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984. For a discussion of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, see generally Reed, CriminalForfeiture Under the Comprehensive ForfeitureAct of 1984: Raising the
Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 747 (1985). The forfeiture provisions under RICO are available
only to the government in civil and criminal cases, and thus are not applicable to the private
litigant. Their most frequent use is, of course, in the criminal arena. Because criminal proceedings may frequently be instigated prior to, or at the time of, civil proceedings under RICO,
the ominous cloud of forfeiture by the government looms over the head of the civil plaintiff and
he should be cognizant of its presence. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. Sections
1963(a)(1) and (2) have also expanded the scope of criminal forfeiture under RICO. These
sections provide respectively for the forfeiture of any interest "acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962," and forfeiture of any "interest in any enterprise" or any "property or
contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over" the enterprise. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a)(1)-(2) (1982).
172. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983)(en banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
173. Tarlow, RICO Forfeituresof Business, 24 TRIAL 52, 53 (Sept. 1988); see also Cauble,
706 F.2d at 1335-39 (detailing distribution of funds in various Cauble businesses.
174. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1330; see also Tarlow, RICO Forfeituresof Business, 24 TRIAL
52, 53 (Sept. 1988). Tarlow cites the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cauble as an example of the
disproportionate nature of RICO forfeiture. Tarlow argues persuasively that the scope of for-
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enterprises, 7 5 assets of entire corporations - not just individual defendants - may also be subject to forfeiture." 6 Furthermore, because of the relation back doctrine, the government's interest in
forfeitable profits vests at the time of the RICO violation.'77 This is
exacerbated by section 1964(d) which provides:
A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any
criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter
shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the
criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the
United States.'

A RICO defendant may also suffer from the government's ability to
acquire a pre-trial restraining order freezing the defendant's assets. 179
This may impair the ability of the defendant to adequately defend
himself in a civil proceeding, not to mention his defense in the criminal proceedings. 80 Furthermore, this poses immediate problems for
feiture under RICO should fit the crime and that the most serious forfeiture sanctions should
be applied only to the most serious crimes. Id. at 55.
175. Since virtually anything can be an enterprise, it follows that the illicitly obtained
proceeds of these enterprises are subject to forfeiture. See cases cited supra note 47.
176. See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393-94 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 297 (1980)(upholding RICO forfeiture of defendant's interest in several corporations).
This situation will arise only in a fact pattern involving an enterprise which is an associationin-fact of solely held corporations owned by one person.
177. The relation back doctrine is codified at 18 U.S.C. section 1963(c). This doctrine
vests the government's title to assets forfeited from the date of the "act giving rise to" their
forfeitability. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. V 1987). The doctrine is used to defeat post-offense
transfers of assets by the defendants. The government has wide discretion to determine which
transactions it wishes to have the jury find voidable under the doctrine. Once such a finding is
made by the jury, "the government will have a title claim to the [identified] asset." Id. This
broad discretion on the part of the government under its forfeiture authority greatly limits the
options available to defense or plaintiff counsel in civil RICO litigation. D. SMITH & T. REED,
supra note 7, 10.05(2], at 10-28.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e).
179. Id. at (d)(1) (Supp. V 1987). Subsection (d)(1) provides:
Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to
preserve the availability to property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture under this
section...
Section 1963(d)(2) allows for the issuance of a temporary restraining order "without notice or
opportunity for a hearing" if the government demonstrates probable cause to believe that the
property may be jeopardized as a result of such notice. See id. at (d)(2).
180. Compare U.S. v. Monsanto,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

109 S. Ct. 2657, 2666,

-

L. Ed. 2d

-'

(1989) (pre-trial order freezing assets not violation of sixth amendment right to counsel or
fifth amendment right to due procees) with United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 926 (4th
Cir. 1987)(preventing payment of legitimate criminal defense fees by restraining funds is un-
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the civil plaintiff, as his cause of action may be stayed pending the
outcome of the criminal trial.'
Therefore, the plaintiff's only recourse is to attempt to reach forfeited assets through a post-verdict
hearing under section M of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984. 182
X.

CONCLUSION

The expansive uses of RICO in the civil arena continue to have
devastating results. The statute's primary purpose was to facilitate
criminal prosecutions of organized crime figures and to prevent the
infiltration of legitimate businesses by criminal elements. This is why
Congress enacted such broad, punitive, and potentially defamatory

civil remedies. As a consequence, plaintiff's counsel are cast in a role
akin to that of a federal prosecutor. It is therefore incumbent upon
constitutional); cf United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1471 (5th Cir. 1986), amended, 809
F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987) (court should consider defendant's right to attorney of choice when
weighing motion for asset-freezing injunction).
181. The use of a stay in pending civil litigation is an alternative to the use of a pre-trial
restraining order. Smith and Reed have observed that "even though most stay precedent addresses parallel civil and criminal suits between the government and the same defendant, a
court's inherent authority to stay matters before it would also appear to encompass parallel
civil and criminal proceedings by the government and private plaintiffs against the same defendant." D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 7.04, at 7-38.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (Supp. III 1985). The private litigant can seek recourse by
entrance of a special appearance at any hearing held to contest the scope of a pre-trail restraining order in a criminal case. See United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1387 (9th Cir.
1984)(holding issuance of pre-trial restraining order without prompt judicial hearing is violative of due process). But see Department of Justice, Handbook on the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1964 And Other Criminal Statutes Enacted by the 98th Congress 44-45
(1984)(need for hearing prior to imposition of pre-trial restraining order obviated by Comprehensive Forfeiture Act). However, once the government has obtained title to forfeited assets,
the post-verdict hearing in the criminal case will offer no remedy to the plaintiff. See United
States v. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. 820, 824 (D. Nev. 1986)(court denying tort claimants relief
from RICO forfeiture order due to absence of "statutory interest in the assets"). The section
1963(m) post-verdict hearing (actually section 1963(a)) is available in situations where a government attempts to bring parallel private civil RICO litigation. Id.
Once the government obtains title to forfeited assets, however, any attempt by third parties to execute upon or otherwise encumber the forfeited assets would probably be precluded by 18 U.S.C. section 1963(i) beyond those limited avenues of redress recognized in
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act under section 1963(1). If the government attempts to
bring parallel private civil RICO litigation within the purview of the no-intervention provisions, plaintiff's counsel should move to have a timely judicial ruling on whether the
plaintiff's racketeering cause of action is a 'legal right, title or interest in the [forfeitable]
property' sufficient to give plaintiff standing to make a section m petition.
D. SMITH & T. REED, supra note 7, 7.04, at 7-40.
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plaintiffs' counsel to cautiously assess the claim's nexus to a real pattern of corruption. It would be prudent to identify more than the two
predicate offenses required under the statute. If such a nexus does not
exist, then claims under civil RICO are foreclosed. The statute was
never intended for use in ordinary business litigation, where gardenvariety fraud allegations are asserted as a matter of course.
The authors are compelled to recommend that Congress reform
certain elements of the statute. Primarily, the statute should be
amended to provide for a bifurcation of civil RICO trials. The overall
burden of the plaintiff should remain no greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard; however, the specified predicate offenses should require proof by a heightened standard of review. Most
logically, this should be the clear and convincing standard. Another
avenue of amending this statute may be to require a change in nomenclature so that the terms "racketeer" and "racketeering" are not used
as loosely as is currently in vogue. Finally, as a deterrent to the frivolous pleading of civil RICO violations, the statute should be amended
to allow the awarding of treble attorney fees in cases where the racketeering nexus has been determined to be frivolous and, as a result, the
business' reputation has been injured.
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